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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following scenario:
a company involved in
litigation receives a discovery request that requires searching through
forty of its employees' computers and restoring and searching nearly
1000 backup tapes.' Performing a search and restoration of this size
and scope will take several weeks, maybe even months, and requires
hiring a computer expert. The cost of searching for and restoring this
electronic data2 exceeds $4 million, and this figure does not include
attorney fees or the cost of reviewing the information for privilege.
As outrageous as this amount sounds, it was what the court in
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson3 found the defendant's
discovery request would cost the plaintiff to produce.4 The Medtronic
1. Backup tapes are off-line storage devices maintained for disaster purposes.
11.446 (2004).
2. Documents and information are considered electronic if they are contained in
mediums that can only be read by computers. THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §

PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 1 [hereinafter THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES] (Jonathan M.

Redgrave ed., Jan. 2004), at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/miscFiles/Sedona
Principles200401 (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
3. No. 01-2372-M1V, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2003) (action
involving trade secrets, patents, and trade information).
4. Id. at *28.
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discovery request typifies the exorbitant costs and burdens associated
with the discovery of electronic data, or e-discovery. The court's
response to the request is likewise representative of how federal
district courts have approached the problems of e-discovery After
applying a balancing test, the court ordered Medtronic to bear the
entire cost of searching the employees' computers for relevant
information, 6 and ordered Medtronic to bear 70 percent of the cost of
While shifting a
searching and restoring the backup tapes.7
percentage of the cost relieved Medtronic of some of the burden, this
compromise also meant that Michelson was responsible for paying a
portion of the production cost before he could have access to
information he described as critical to his defense.'

In August 2004, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (the
"Committee") released a package of proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure intended in part to address the cost
and burden of e-discovery.9 In an introductory comment, the
Committee acknowledged that the federal discovery rules are not

adequate to accommodate new forms of information technology, the
discovery of which is more burdensome and costly than traditional

paper discovery because of its "exponentially greater volume."1 To
alleviate the costs and burdens, the Committee proposed to add the

5. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02 C 6832, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
Aug. 9, 2004) (shifting 75 percent of the cost of e-discovery to the
15722, at *31 (N.D. I11.
requesting party); Multitechnology Servs., L.P. v. Verizon Southwest, No. 4:02-CV-702-Y,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12957, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (requiring the parties to split
the cost of e-discovery and classifying "the expense as court costs that can be recovered by
the prevailing party"); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (shifting 25 percent of the cost of e-discovery to the requesting party).
6. Medtronic,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587, at *34.
7. Id. at *41.
8. Id. at *16. Further, if Michelson wished to have additional backup tapes restored
and searched, he would be responsible for paying the entire cost of production and the
majority of the cost of Medtronic's relevance and privilege review. Id. at *47-48.
9. Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 1-2 (proposed May 17, 2004,
revised August 3, 2004), at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.pdf
(last visited Apr. 3, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The package of
proposals includes amendments to Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45 and Form 35. In addition to
addressing the cost and burden of e-discovery, the package of proposals also addresses
early consideration of e-discovery issues, asserting privilege after production, applying
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 33 and 34 to electronically stored information, and
limiting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 sanctions for the loss of information resulting
from the routine operation of computer systems. Id. at 5-6. The Civil Rules Advisory
Committee accepted comments on the proposed amendments through February 15, 2005.
See http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrulesl.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2005) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
10. Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at 2-3.
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following text to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2):
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information that the party identifies as not reasonably
accessible."' On motion by the requesting party, the responding
party must show that the information is not reasonably
accessible. If that showing is made, the court may order
discovery of the information for good 12cause and may specify
terms and conditions for such discovery.
The amendment would relieve a party of producing electronic
information identified as "not reasonably accessible," provided that
the requesting party cannot convince the court that the e-discovery
should be ordered for "good cause."' 3 This proposal is significant

because it makes a distinction between the discoverability of
accessible data and "not reasonably accessible" data. 4 Under the

current Rules, 5 most courts have determined that all electronic
information is equally discoverable and do not consider whether the
information is reasonably accessible.

6

This Comment argues that

despite the protective language proposed for addition to Rule
26(b)(2), the amendment offers electronic data identified as not
reasonably accessible no greater protection from discovery than the
current version of the Rule provides because the good cause

requirement in the proposed amendment is not strict enough.
Protecting electronic data identified as not reasonably accessible is
important to prevent the cost of e-discovery from becoming
prohibitive. A weak good cause requirement would place too great a
11. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (proposed May
17, 2004, revised August 3, 2004), at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/
CVAug04.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). "But if the responding party
has actually accessed the requested information, it may not rely on this rule as an excuse
from providing discovery, even if it incurred substantial expense in accessing the
information." Id. at 3.
12. Id. at 6.
13. Id. For a discussion of the definition of the terms "not reasonably accessible" and
"good cause" see infra Section IV.
14. Id.
15. Rule 34 was amended in 1970 to provide for the production of "data compilations
from which information can be readily obtained, if necessary, by the respondents through
detection devices into reasonably usable form." FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).
16. See, e.g., Simon Prop. Group, L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639,640 (S.D. Ind.
2000) ("[C]omputer records, including records that have been 'deleted,' are documents
discoverable under FED. R. Civ. P. 34."). But see McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33
(D.C. 2001) ("There is certainly no controlling authority for the proposition that restoring
all backup tapes is necessary in every case. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
require such a search ....
").
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burden on a litigant to produce electronic data identified as not
reasonably accessible. This burden in turn could discourage the
retention of data and could encourage requesting parties to use broad
e-discovery requests as a means of compelling settlements.
This Comment identifies the problems associated with ediscovery, with an emphasis on the problem of the high cost of
conducting e-discovery, and summarizes the current approach to ediscovery based on the present version of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the existing case law. After examining some of the
emerging trends and new approaches developing under the current
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Comment discusses the
proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2). Based on this Comment's
conclusion that the current language of the Committee Note
accompanying the proposed amendment does not sufficiently protect
discovery of electronic data identified as not reasonably accessible,
this Comment recommends that the Committee consider
strengthening the protection the amendment will provide.
Strengthening may be accomplished by requiring a stricter analysis of
what constitutes "good cause" to require discovery of electronic data
that is not reasonably accessible, or by further delineating the
categories of electronic data to distinguish between the
discoverability of backup data (discoverable upon a showing of good
cause) and deleted data (not discoverable unless the requesting party
can show the data was deleted by the responding party in bad faith).
Before addressing the proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2), it
is necessary to define e-discovery, illustrate the problem of the high
cost of producing electronic data, and understand how e-discovery is
presently conducted under the current Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and existing case law.
I. DEFINING E-DISCOVERY AND THE PROBLEM OF HIGH
PRODUCTION COSTS

The Committee recognized that e-discovery raises different
issues than traditional discovery and that these issues require special
rules of procedure.17 The most apparent difference between ediscovery and traditional paper discovery is the medium at issue.
Moore's Federal Practice draws four distinctions between traditional
paper files and computer-based information.18 The first and most
17. See Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at 2-3.
18. 7 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, I 37A.01[2] (3d ed,

2004).
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significant of these distinctions is the "sheer magnitude of data"
stored in computers.19 An astounding 99.99 percent of information is
generated in non-printed form.2" In the year 2002, almost five
exabytes of information was generated. 21 An exabyte is roughly the
equivalent of 500,000 libraries the size of the Library of Congress.2 2
Of the five exabytes produced in 2002, only 0.01 percent was stored in
paper records, while nearly 92 percent was stored on magnetic media
such as computer hard disks. 23 And the amount of information
produced electronically continues to grow-between 1999 and 2002,
new stored information grew by an estimated 30 percent.24
Second, a significant majority of documents created
electronically are never converted into hard copy.25 E-discovery is
thus often the only means by which a party can access the information
sought.
Third, computer-generated documents contain embedded data
that does not appear in paper copies. 26 Referred to as metadata, this
embedded data contains information such as the file creation date
and when the file was last edited,27 information which can be used as
evidence to prove when a document was actually created or altered,
and which computer user last accessed the file.
Fourth, electronic documents differ from paper documents
because computer generated documents that have been "deleted"
are, in most cases, not irretrievably lost. 28 There are two ways data
can remain on a computer hard drive after the user has purposely
deleted the files containing the data. First, many computer programs
employ an automatic backup feature that saves files that are deleted

19. Id.
20. Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy e-Discovery
Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53, at 6 (2004), at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vl0i5/

article53.pdf (citing Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much Information? 2003, at 1, at
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/printable-report.pdf
(Oct. 30, 2003)) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
21. Stephen D. Williger and Robin M. Wilson, Negotiatingthe Minefields of Electronic
Discovery, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 52, at 6 (2004), at http://Iaw.richmond.edu/jolt/vl0i5/
article52.pdf (citing Lyman, How Much Information? 2003, at 1) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
22. Id. at *2, n.1 ("An 'exabyte'. is a measure of the capacity of digital storage media
that is... equal to 1,125,899,906,842,624 kilobytes.
23. Id. at *2.
24. Lyman, How Much Information?2003, at *2.
25. MOORE, supra note 18, T 37A.01[2].
26. Id.
27. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).
28. MOORE, supra note 18, $ 37A.01[2].
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or accidentally lost. 29 This type of data is also referred to as
"replicant data," "temporary files," or "file clones," and remains on
the hard drive after the original file is deleted.30 Second, when a user
deletes a file, the computer does not immediately erase the
information, but instead marks as "not in use" the portions of the
hard disk directory containing that file.3' When the computer needs
space to save new information, it will write over the space marked
"not in use." Until a new file is saved in place of the deleted file,
however, the deleted file will remain on the hard drive.32 Thus it is
possible that, unknown to the user, all or a portion of a deleted file
still remains on the computer hard drive long after it was deleted.33
In addition to remaining on the hard drive of a computer, deleted
files can be retained on backup tapes.34 Backup data is data that is
stored off-line on tapes or disks and maintained for disaster
purposes.35 A backup tape takes a snapshot of all data that exists on a
server at the time the backup is made.3 6 A file which is subsequently
deleted from the computer hard drive will be preserved on the
backup tape.
To fully grasp the import of the proposed amendment to Rule
26(b)(2), it is necessary to understand the types of information courts
currently deem discoverable. Electronic data is generally divided into
two broad categories: that which is accessed in the ordinary course of
business, and that which is not routinely retrieved or used for business
purposes.37 Data that is not routinely retrieved or used for business
purposes includes metadata, data stored on backup tapes, "deleted"
data, system data (information created and maintained by the
computer itself, including documentation of the creation or deletion
of files and directories and other maintenance functions) and residual
data (data that "exists in bits and pieces throughout a computer hard

29. Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil
Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up To the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 336-37

(2000).

30. See id.
31. Id.
32. Id. This type of data is commonly referred to as "residual data." See also Marnie
H. Pulver, Note, Electronic Media Discovery: The Economic Benefit of Pay-Per-View, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 1379, 1380-83 (2000) (illustrating how a computer user can create
seven discoverable copies of various versions of a file in less than twenty-four hours).
33. See Michael Marron, Comment, Discoverability of "Deleted" E-Mail: Time for a
CloserExamination,25 SEATTLE U. L. Rev. 895, 907-08 (2002).
34. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 29, at 337.
35. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 27, § 11.446.
36. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 29, at 337.
37. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 27, § 11.446.
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drive"). 38 Data that is accessible in the "ordinary course of business"
refers to data to which a litigant would have access in the ordinary

course of its day-to-day use of its computer systems.39 Current law
does not distinguish between these two categories of electronic data:
both are deemed discoverable.
It is not difficult to appreciate how important data not accessed
for business purposes can be for a litigant who is seeking production
of information relevant to a claim. Often the information that is
potentially most helpful to a litigant is located in a deleted file,
metadata, or on a backup tape.4" This statement is especially true for

deleted electronic mail files, or e-mails. E-mail is an informal mode
of communication that many people treat as they do conversations,
discussing information they would not include in hard-copy
documents.4' There is therefore a greater chance that an e-mail,
particularly a deleted one, will contain the "smoking gun" sought to
42
prove one's claim.

However, discovery of data not accessed for business purposes
comes at a high cost. Take, for instance, the discovery of data stored
on backup tapes.43 Because backup tapes are not archives, but a
38. Id.
39. Amendments to Civil Discovery Standards, at 6, at http://www.abanet.org/
litigation/documents/hod/ABA%20Final%20Revised%202004%20Amendments%20Civil
%20Discovery%2OStandards.doc (August 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
40. Consider, for instance, an employment discrimination claim where the plaintiff
has the burden of proving that she was fired for inappropriate reasons. It is unlikely that
the official company record would list an inappropriate reason for dismissal. Rather, the
proof the plaintiff would need, assuming it exists, would more likely be found in a less
formal record or communication, namely e-mail. Most e-mail is deleted soon after it is
received, meaning the plaintiff would need access to either the deleted file or a backup
tape containing a snapshot of the computer system taken before the file was deleted to
prove her case. Alternatively, metadata could assist the plaintiff in showing that the
contents of a particular file were subsequently altered, as proof that the previous contents
were damaging to the defendant's case. For an example of a case where the proof the
plaintiff needed to support her claim was only located in deleted files, see Playboy
Enterprises,Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1051, 1058 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (ordering the
creation of a mirror image of defendant's hard drive after plaintiff alleged the defendant
was actively deleting e-mail communications that could be used as evidence against her).
41. Bahar Shariati, Note, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg: Evidence that the FederalRules
of Civil Procedure Provide the Means for Determining Cost Allocation in Electronic
Discovery Disputes?, 49 VILL. L. REV. 393, 406 (2004) (citing Jonathan B. Ealy & Aaron
M. Schutt, What-If Anything-Is an E-mail? Applying Alaska's Civil Discovery Rules to
E-mail Production, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 119, 122 (2002)); Scott Sleek, Good Erecordkeeping Saves You Money, Protects You from Liability, DIGITAL DISCOVERY AND
E-EVIDENCE, Dec. 2000, at 4).
42. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 29, at 329.
43. For an overview of the problems associated with searching a backup system, see
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disaster recovery system," the data is not organized for the retrieval
of individual files.4 5 They are sequential-access devices, so to access a
particular block of data requires searching all of the preceding blocks
of data. 6 Consequently, a party may have to search all of its backup
tapes to locate a single file, the data for which could be spread across
any number of tapes. 47 Before the data on a backup tape can be
accessed, it must be restored to the system from which it was
recorded.4 8 Restoring a backup tape takes approximately six to
twelve hours.49 In Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis,5" the defendant
company had 125 network servers, each of which was backed up on a
daily, weekly, and monthly basis. 1 Restoring just the monthly backup
tapes for all 125 servers for a twelve-month period would take an
estimated 9,000 to 18,000 hours. 2 The restoration process is as costly
as it is lengthy. The defendant in Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor
Daniel, Inc. 3 estimated that responding to the plaintiff's discovery
request for e-mail messages would require a six-month search of 93
backup tapes at a cost of approximately $6.2 million. 4 Additionally,
since backup tapes are normally re-used and the data stored on them
is overwritten, a party involved in litigation will have to purchase
additional backup tapes to avoid overwriting data that may be related
to the litigation. For the defendant in Wiginton, preserving backup
MOORE, supranote 18,

37A.32[2][e][i].
44. See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19128, at
*7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003) costs and fees proceeding, No. 02 C 6832, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15722 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2004).
45. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting
Webopedia, at http://inews.webopedia.com/TERM/t/tape-drive.html (last visited Apr. 3,
2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based
Discovery in FederalCivil Litigation(unpublished manuscript) at 15).
46. Id.
47. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01-2373-M1V, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8587, at *14 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2003).
48. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 27, § 11.446.
49. See Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19128, at *7.
50. No. 02 C 6832, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19128 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27,2003).
51. Id. at *6-7.
52. Id. at *7-8.
53. 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 168 (E.D. La. 2002), available at 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3196.
54. Id. at *6.
55. See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24068, at *16 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 3, 1997) (holding that once a complaint is filed, a
litigant "is under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant
in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is
reasonably likely to be requested during discovery, and/or is the subject of a pending
discovery request." (quoting Turner v. Hudson Transit, 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y.
1991))).
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tapes for 125 servers translated into a cost of $12,500 per day to buy
new backup tapes.56 With most litigation lasting months to years, the
costs can add up quickly.
While it is true that under some circumstances e-discovery is
cheaper than traditional discovery, such as when the information
sought is readily accessible and can be copied onto a disk, e-discovery
generally presents a greater burden and cost than traditional
discovery. For example, the defendants in Jones v. Goord 7 estimated
the cost of searching their databases in response to a discovery

request to be in excess of $100,000.8 Thus, even documents readily
accessible as part of the ordinary course of business can constitute a
great burden and present a high cost.5 9
The high costs associated with e-discovery have not affected the

courts' position on the discoverability of electronic data. 60 Courts
regularly require a party to search its backup tapes during discovery
for deleted or archived files.61 For example, in Zhou v. Pittsburgh
State University,6 2 a case involving employment discrimination, the
plaintiff sought discovery of underlying computer-generated data
used to create a table reflecting the salaries of music department
faculty from 1996 to 2000.63 The defendant produced a combination

of computer-generated data and handwritten documents relating to
the formulation of the salary tables for the years 1998 to 2000, but
contended that it could not produce records from 1997 because its

document retention policy only called for preserving documents for a
period of five years. 64 In its response to a motion to compel the 1997
documents, the employer stated it could not "produce copies of

documents that do not exist."65 The court disagreed, reasoning that

56. Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19128, at *8.
57. No. 95 Civ 8026 (GEL), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707 (S.D.N.Y. May 16,2002).
58. Id. at *32. The court did not order discovery of the databases because it found
that the risks and burdens to the defendants were not worth bearing based on entirely
speculative benefits. Id. at *48.
59. See Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at 2.
60. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, No. 94 C 897, 1995 WL 360526, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 1995) ("[T]he mere fact that production of computerized data will
result in a substantial expense is not a sufficient justification for imposing the costs of
production on the requesting party.").
61. See, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 309 F.
Supp. 2d 459, 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the defendant was required to search
"off-line" backup tapes for requested data and was further required to pay for the cost of
conducting the search).
62. No. 01-2493-KHV, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6398 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 2003).
63. Id. at*1-2.
64. Id. at *3.
65. Id. (quoting Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel at 2 (doc.
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Rule 34's definition of a discoverable document applies to deleted
files and backup tapes.66 The court ordered the employer to take
reasonable steps to disclose any backup or archival tapes that would
provide information about deleted electronic data.67 The court did
not define what taking "reasonable steps" entails, but ordered the
defendant to disclose all data compilations, including those preserved
only on backup tapes, or alternatively to show cause why it did not
comply with the order and describe efforts made to comply with the
order. 68 The court did not discuss the costs associated with searching
a year's worth of backup tapes when formulating its order.
Under certain circumstances, courts also order the creation of a
mirror image of a party's hard drive in order to search for deleted
data for which no backup exists.69 The court in The Antioch Co. v.
Scrapbook Borders, Inc., ° ordered the creation of a mirror image of
the defendant's computer equipment after determining that "deleted"
data potentially relevant to the plaintiffs claims was being lost
through the normal use of the computers." Mirror imaging creates a
copy of a computer hard drive that represents a snapshot of all of the
computer's records, including all embedded, residual, and deleted
data.72 A benefit of creating a mirror image is that the retrieval
process itself does not destroy information on the computer.73
However, there are serious detriments associated with the mirror
imaging process that require careful consideration by the court before
ordering such intrusive discovery. A court order for the creation of a
mirror image of a business's computer hard drives means the business
loses several hours of productivity. 74 Creating mirror images also
raises issues of privilege by potentially exposing confidential
109)).
66. Id. at *5-6.
67. Id.

68. Id. at *6-7.
69. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999)

(ordering a mirror image of the defendant's computer hard drive to search for deleted emails only after determining that the need for the information outweighed the burden to
the defendant, pursuant to the balancing factors of Rule 26(b)(2)).
70. 210 F.R.D. 645 (Minn. 2002).

71. Id. at 651-53. The court held that it would appoint a neutral computer expert to
produce the mirror image in order to preserve privilege.
72. MOORE, supra note 18,
73. Id.

37A.32[3][c][ii][B].

74. See id. at I 37A.32[3][c][[ii][B]-[C] (citing Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Welles, 60 F.
Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (mirror imaging process took approximately four to
eight hours for each computer); Alexander v. FBI, 188 F.R.D. 111, 117 (D.D.C. 1998)

(restoring one employee's archived "C" or "F" drive required about 265 hours and cost
approximately $15,675 in contractor's fees)).
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documents.75

Privilege becomes an issue in situations where a party is required
to turn over computer files to the opposing party.76 This Comment,
however, focuses on the problem of the high cost of e-discovery
considered in light of the fact that a large percentage of information is

stored electronically. As the next Section of this Comment illustrates,
courts have worked to strike a balance between compelling e-

discovery in situations where the potential for production of relevant
information is high,7 7 restricting e-discovery when the costs and
burdens are not worth the possible benefits,78 and shifting or sharing

the costs of e-discovery where the circumstances call for a
compromise.79

Operating under the framework of the existing

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts' efforts to control ediscovery have met mixed results. The next Section of this Comment

discusses the approaches currently taken by courts facing the issue of
e-discovery.

75. See id. at 37A.32[3][c][ii][D].
76. See id. at 37A.32[3][c].
77. See, e.g., Zonoras v. General Motors Corp., No. C-3-94-161, 1996 WL 1671236, at
*3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 1996) (denying defendant's motion for a protective order upon a
finding that "[u]nder the standard enunciated in Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) ... the expense of the
proposed discovery does not outweigh its likely benefit ... ").
78. See, e.g., Toghiyany v. American Propane, Inc., 309 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2002)
(affirming district court's denial of defendant's motions to compel e-discovery); Fennell v.
First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 533 (1st Cir. 1996) (denying plaintiff's Rule 56(f)
motion for further discovery after affirming the finding of the district court that (1)
reopening the discovery process would involve (a) substantial risks, such as confidentiality
and privilege problems and (b) added costs from increased legal and expert fees; and (2)
that the plaintiff "did not sufficiently set forth a plausible basis for believing that specified
facts, susceptible of collection within a reasonable time frame, probably exist") (internal
quotations omitted); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24068 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 3, 1997) (denying the plaintiff's request that the
defendant search its backup tapes for deleted e-mails on the grounds that the recreation of
the backup tapes would involve significant cost, the potential benefits from doing so were
questionable, and thus the burdens outweighed the potential limited gains from a search of
the tapes).
79. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(ordering the cost of e-discovery to be shared between the parties, with the responding
party bearing the burden of 75 percent of the cost); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No.
02 C 6832, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15722, at *31 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2004) (shifting 75 percent
of the cost of e-discovery to the requesting party); Multitechnology Servs., L.P. v. Verizon
Southwest, No. 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12957, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 12,
2004) (ordering the parties to evenly shoulder the expense of e-discovery); Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01-2373-MIV, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587, at *53
(W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2003) (shifting some of the cost of e-discovery to the requesting
party).
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II. E-DISCOVERY UNDER THE CURRENT RULES AND EXISTING
CASE LAW
Under the current version of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, all discoverable information, including electronic
information that is not reasonably accessible, is subject to the
limitations set out in Rule 26(b)(2),80 which states:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods
otherwise permitted under these rules and by any local rule

shall be limited by the court if it determines that:

(i) the

discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or

is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient,
less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking
discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action

to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking
into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in
the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in
8
resolving the issues. 1

A responding party, therefore, can object to any discovery
request (traditional or e-discovery) on the grounds laid out in Rule
26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). In response to an objection, the court can,
among other options, compel discovery, deny the discovery request,

shift the cost of discovery to the requesting party, or order the parties
to share the cost of discovery.'

Litigants have filed Rule 26(c)

80. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2004) ("All discovery is subject to the limitations
imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).").
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) reads:
Upon motion by a party... and for good cause shown, the court... may make any
order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of
the following: (1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had; (2) that the
disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions,
including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only
by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure or
discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no
one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition, after
being sealed, be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or
be revealed only in a designated way; and (8) that the parties simultaneously file
specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

motions for protective orders to preclude e-discovery with varying
results. s3 The trend of the case law has been to compel e-discovery,

though many courts seek to alleviate the burden on the responding
party by shifting all or a portion of the cost of discovery.'
Cases are rarely appealed on the basis of discovery errors, so
there is little precedent to guide district courts grappling with the
problem of e-discovery. As a result, courts have developed different
approaches to determine whether to shift the cost of production.85

There are four main approaches utilized by courts: (1) the cost-based
utility approach; (3) the Rowe test; and (4)
approach; (2) the marginal
86
factors.
the Zubulake
The cost-based approach advocates charging the costs of ediscovery to the requesting party. 87 The theory is based on market

economics-an individual will pay a fair value for what he seeks.88
The argument is that charging the requesting party ensures that the
requesting party will only ask for what is needed, thereby reducing
the scope and size of some discovery requests.89 This approach has

not been embraced by the courts. While some courts have allocated
the total cost of e-discovery to the requesting party, those courts did
not cite the cost-based approach as their reason for so doing.9" Courts
directed by the court.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
83. Compare Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 460 (D. Utah 1985) (denying
defendant's Rule 26(c) motion and compelling e-discovery), with Toghiyany v. Amerigas
Propane, Inc., 309 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's denial of
defendant's motions to compel e-discovery), Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D.
280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ordering the cost of e-discovery to be shared between the
parties, with the responding party bearing the burden of 75 percent of the cost), and Rowe
Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,433 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (shifting
the cost of e-discovery to the plaintiff upon a finding that a majority of the factors in a
balancing test tipped in favor of shifting the cost).
84. See, e.g., Wiginton, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15722, at *31 (shifting 75 percent of the
cost of e-discovery to the requesting party); Multitechnology Servs., L.P. v. Verizon
Southwest, No. 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12957, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 12,
2004) (ordering the parties to "evenly shoulder" the expense of e-discovery).
85. As discussed, while courts can suppress or compel discovery under Rule 26(c),
most courts opt for the middle ground of shifting all or a portion of the cost of discovery.
86. Williger & Wilson, supra note 21, at 6-12.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Pulver, Note, supra note 32, at 1398 (citing PUBLILIUS SYRUS (1st Cent. B.C.),
reprinted in WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND

POLICY 95 (7th ed. 1998) ("Everything is worth what [the] purchaser will pay for it.")).
89. Williger & Wilson, supra note 21, at 6.
90. See, e.g., Byers v. Ill. State Police, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 740, 754-57 (N.D. I11.
2002) (shifting the cost of discovery to the requesting party based upon an application of
the Rowe test).
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have rejected the cost-based approach for two reasons: it does not

take into account the fact that in some cases the production of
electronic media is cheaper than the production of paper-based
documents; and it ignores the presumption established by the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure that the responding party pays for the cost
of production.91
The court in McPeek v. Ashcroft' adopted the marginal utility
approach and held that "[t]he more likely it is that the backup tape
contains information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer
it is that the [responding party] search at its own expense."93 The
court rejected the two extremes of always keeping the cost with the
responding party and always shifting the cost to the requesting party.
It felt that making the responding party pay all the costs creates a

disincentive for the requesting party to limit the scope of its request,94
whereas always shifting the costs to the requesting party means that at
times the requesting party will have to pay to search computer
records for relevant information when it would not be required to pay

for the same search of a paper depository.95 Thus, under the marginal
utility test, a court can order a test run, or limited search of backup
tapes, to gauge the likelihood that the backup tapes contain relevant
information and allocate the costs of e-discovery accordingly.96
The Southern District of New York in Rowe Entertainment,Inc.
v. William Morris Agency, Inc.' likewise felt that a bright-line rule
favoring either extreme had considerable shortcomings but favored a
91. See Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 601
(E.D.Wis. 2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
92. 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
93. Id. at 34.
94. Id. at 33-34. The court explained:
The one judicial rationale that has emerged is that producing backup tapes is a
cost of doing business in the computer age. But, that assumes an alternative. It is
impossible to walk ten feet into the office of a private business or government
agency without seeing a network computer, which is on a server, which, in turn, is
being backed up on tape (or some other media) on a daily, weekly or monthly
basis. What alternative is there? Quill pens? Furthermore, making the producing
party pay for all costs of restoration as a cost of its "choice" to use computers
creates a disincentive for the requesting party to demand anything less than all of
the tapes. American lawyers engaged in discovery have never been accused of
asking for too little.... They hardly need any more encouragement to demand as
much as they can from their opponent.
Id.
95. Id. The court also objected to the cost-based approach because it is not well
suited to application when a government agency is involved.
96. See Williger & Wilson, supra note 21, at 7.
97. 205 F.R.D. 421,429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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more detailed factor test to McPeek's limited approach.98 The court
adopted a balancing approach that takes into consideration eight
factors:
(1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of
discovering critical information; (3) the availability of such
information from other sources; (4) the purposes for which the
responding party maintains the requested data; (5) the relative
benefit to the parties of obtaining the information; (6) the total
cost associated with production; (7) the relative ability of each
party to control costs and its incentive to do so; and (8) the
resources available to each party.99
Each factor is to be weighed to determine whether shifting the
cost to the requesting party would be appropriate. If the majority of
the factors favor cost shifting, then all or a portion of the costs of ediscovery should be shifted to the requesting party. 100 The Rowe test
became the "gold standard for courts resolving electronic discovery
1 1 with five courts following the Rowe test or some slight
disputes,""
12
variation therein. 0
In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, °3 the court found fault with
the Rowe test for several reasons: it omits two of the factors outlined
in Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) to be considered when evaluating a motion for a
protective order;""° its fourth factor (the purposes for retaining the
data) is nonessential because it has no direct impact on the
accessibility of electronic information; it gives equal weight to all of
the factors when certain factors should predominate; and it favors
cost-shifting, which is contrary to the presumption that the
98. Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
99. Id. at 429.
100. See id.
101. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
102. See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02-CV-C6832, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15722, at *13-15 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 9, 2004); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Quest Software,
Inc., 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 401, 402 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.,
v. Michelson., No. 01-2373-M1V, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587, at *9-11 (W.D. Tenn. May
13, 2003); Byers v. Ill. State Police, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 740, 754 (N.D. Ill. 2002);
Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 02 Civ. 4791 (HB) (DFE), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2293, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2002); In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D.
437, 442-43 (D.N.J. 2002); In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., No. 98 Civ. 7161(VM)
(DFE), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26446, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2002); Murphy Oil

USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 168, 172-74 (E.D. La. 2002).
103. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

104. The omitted factors are: (1) the amount in controversy and (2) the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii).
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responding party should bear the burden of discovery.105 The court
developed a new test based loosely on the Rowe test:
(1) The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to
discover relevant information; (2) the availability of such
information from other sources; (3) The total cost of
production, compared to the amount of controversy; (4) The
total cost of production, compared to the resources available to
each party; (5) The relative ability of each party to control costs
and its incentive to do so; (6) The importance of the issues at
relative benefits to the
stake in the litigation; and (7) The
1 6
information.
the
obtaining
of
parties
Unlike the cost-benefit analysis, the marginal utility approach,
and the Rowe test, the Zubulake factors bring the cost-shifting
analysis closer in line with the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and
(iii). According to Zubulake, cost-shifting should not be considered
in every e-discovery case, but only in cases where the court finds the
cost of production to be an undue burden or expense.0 7 Whether the
production is an undue burden or expense depends on the
accessibility of the data. 08 Zubulake recognizes five categories of
data: (1) active, online data, such as active hard drives; (2) near-line
data, referring to a robotic library that houses removable media; (3)
offline storage and archives, which are removable disks and tapes; (4)
backup tapes, which store compressed data; and (5) erased,
fragmented, or damaged data.'019 If the data is on backup tapes or is
erased, fragmented, or damaged, then the court should employ the
Zubulake factors to determine if all or part of the cost should be
shifted to the requesting party."0 While it is too soon to tell whether
Zubulake has replaced Rowe as the "gold standard," a majority of the
courts addressing cost shifting since Zubulake was decided have used
its factors to make the determination."'
105. See Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 602
(E.D. Wis. 2004); Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 320-21.
106. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 322.
107. See id. at 318.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 318-20.
110. ld. at 324.
111. See Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 602-03
(E.D. Wis. 2004); Multitechnology Servs., L.P. v. Verizon Southwest, No. 4:02-CV-702-Y,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12957, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004); Xpedior Creditor Trust v.
Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp.2d 459, 465-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). But
see Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02-C6832, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15722, at *13
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2004) (modifying the Zubulake factors by adding a factor considering the
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In light of Rule 34's language that electronic data compilations
are discoverable, all of the case law approaches treat electronic data
that is not accessible in the course of business as discoverable. n2
However, it is evident from the opinions that the courts recognize the
unique costs and burdens associated with e-discovery. Courts are
routinely exercising one of the only options currently available to
alleviate that burden by shifting and sharing the costs of e-discovery.
Some states and legal institutions have advocated alternative
solutions to the approaches taken by the courts. While these
alternative approaches were formed based upon the current version
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is helpful to examine them
to understand what options were available to the Committee in
drafting the proposed amendment.
III. EMERGING TRENDS AND NEW PRACTICES UNDER THE
CURRENT RULES

Dissatisfied with the current trend of the case law, and in the
absence of changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, some
states and local districts have adopted local rules imposing limitations
on e-discovery. Texas, Mississippi, and California have recognized
the need to differentiate between the discoverability of electronic
data accessible in the course of business from data that is not
accessible in the course of business. 13
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.4 states that a responding
party has the duty to produce all responsive electronic data that "is
reasonably available to the responding party in its ordinary course of
business.""' 4 If the responding party is not able to retrieve the
requested information using "reasonable efforts," then it can object
to complying with the rules. 15 A court can order the responding
party to comply with the request, but if a court so orders, then "the
importance of the requested discovery to resolve the issues of the litigation).
112. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
113. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 196.4 (2004); MiSS. RULE Civ. P. 26(b)(5) (2004); CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 2017(e) (2004). Some district courts have also promulgated rules related to
e-discovery. See U.S. DIST. Cr. ARK. L.R. 26.1(4) (2004); U.S. DIST. CT. N.J. L.Civ.R.
26.1(d) (2004); U.S. DIST. Cr. Wyo. CIV. R. 26.1(d) (2004); Electronic Discovery
Guidelines for the Kansas District Courts, at http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/attorney/
electronicdiscoveryguidelines.pdf. (last visited Apr. 3, 2005) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Default Standard for Discovery of Electronic Documents ("EDiscovery") for the Delaware District Courts, at http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/Announce/
HotPage21.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
114. TEx. R. Civ. P. 196.4 (2004).
115. Id.
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court must also order that the requesting party pay the reasonable
steps required to retrieve and produce
expenses of any extraordinary
16
the information.'
In sum, Texas's rule creates two bright-line rules. First, it
distinguishes between electronic data that is available in the ordinary
course of business (discoverable) and that which is not reasonably
available (discoverable only pursuant to a court order). Second, it
mandates that the requesting party pay for the production of
unavailable electronic data.
Mississippi's rule is identical to Texas's with the exception of one
key word. Instead of mandating that a court must order the
requesting party to pay the reasonable expense of retrieving and
producing unavailable electronic data, Mississippi Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(5) states that "the court may also order that the
requesting party pay the reasonable expenses of any extraordinary
steps required to retrieve and produce the information."'' 7 Thus, in
contrast to Texas, Mississippi's variation allows for court discretion in
assigning the costs of electronic discovery.
California only allows discovery to be conducted in electronic
media upon the express finding of the court that the orders meet all
of the following criteria:
(A) They promote cost-effective and efficient discovery or
motions relating thereto. (B) They do not impose or require
undue expenditures of time or money. (C) They do not create
an undue economic burden or hardship on any person. (D)
They promote open competition among vendors and providers
of services in order to facilitate the highest quality service at the
lowest reasonable cost to the litigants. (E) They do not require
parties or counsel to purchase exceptional or unnecessary
services, hardware, or software. 8
If an e-discovery request does not meet the requirements listed,
then the request shall be denied. This approach is in contrast to
Texas and Mississippi, both because the restrictions are not limited to
inaccessible data, and because it does not provide for shifting the
costs.

Both the Sedona Conference and the American Bar Association
have published e-discovery guidelines that address the discoverability
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) (emphasis added).
118. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2017(e)(2) (2004).
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of electronic data. The Sedona Principles, developed by a working
group of the Sedona Conference,11 9 are fourteen guidelines that
address the unique challenges that e-discovery poses. 20 They are
21
intended to complement the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Of
particular interest are Principles 8 and 9. Principle 8 states:
The primary source of electronic data and documents for
production should be active data and information purposefully
stored in a manner that anticipates future business use and
permits efficient searching and retrieval. Resort to disaster
recovery backup tapes and other sources of data and
documents requires the requesting party to demonstrate need
and relevance that outweigh the cost, burden, and disruption of
retrieving and processing the data from such sources. 22
Principle 9 states, "[A]bsent a showing of special need and
relevance a responding party should not be required to preserve,
review, or produce deleted, shadowed, fragmented, or residual data
or documents."' 23 The Sedona Principles distinguish between the
discoverability of backup tapes and deleted electronic data.
According to the Sedona Principles, information stored on backup
tapes is discoverable, subject to the considerations of Rule
26(b)(2)(iii), but deleted data is not discoverable "[a]bsent a showing
of special need and relevance .... 24
The American Bar Association first published civil discovery
standards in 1999 and revised them in 2004.125 Standard 29(b)(iii)
formerly stated "[t]he discovering party generally should bear any
special expenses incurred by the responding party in producing
requested electronic information," and went further to say that the
responding party generally should not have to incur any undue
burden or expense in producing the electronic information. 2 6 In
place of this language, the amended Standard 29(b) lists sixteen

119. See http://www.thesedonaconference.org/aboutushtml for information about the
Sedona Conference (last visited Apr. 3, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
120. See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at i.
121. See id. at 1.
122. Id. at i.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Amendments to Civil Discovery Standards, at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/
documents/hod/ABA%20Final%20Revised%202004%20Amendments%2Civil%2Disc
overy%20Standards.doc (August 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
126. Id. at 7.
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factors that the court should consider when ruling on a motion to
compel or protect against e-discovery, or when allocating the costs of
e-discovery. 127 Included in these factors are many of the same
principles evident in the Rowe test and the Zubulake factors.'28
An examination of the state rules and recommendations of the
Sedona Conference and the ABA do not establish a common trend,
as each attempts to resolve the problems associated with e-discovery
in a different manner. Texas and Mississippi distinguish between the
discoverability of data that is or is not accessible in the ordinary
course of business, making the discoverability of the latter contingent
upon the payment of the expense of production by the requesting
party. The Sedona Conference also distinguishes between types of
data, recommending that backup tapes be discoverable pursuant to
the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) and that deleted data be
discoverable upon a showing of special need and relevance. In
contrast, California's Rule and the ABA Standards apply to all ediscovery, whether the data is accessible or not. California conditions
discoverability on a consideration of the economic burden and related
factors, while the ABA adopts and expands the existing case law
factors test from Zubulake and Rowe. However, the proliferation of
rules and suggestions that differ from the approach taken by the
current Rules of Civil Procedure and the case law interpreting them
indicates that the current Rules do not supply a satisfactory remedy
to e-discovery issues. This implication underscores the need for the
amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2) to change
the way the courts have handled e-discovery.
Having discussed the problem of the high cost of production
associated with e-discovery, the current approach to e-discovery
under the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and case law, and
the new trends emerging in the production of electronic data, this
Comment now addresses the proposed amendment to the Rule
26(b)(2).

127. Id. at 5-7.
128. See id. Standard 29(b)(iii) factors include considerations of the burden and
expense of discovery, the availability of the information from alternate sources, the scope
of the discovery request, the extent to which production would affect the normal
operations of the responding party, whether the requesting party has offered to pay
discovery expenses, the relative ability of the party to control discovery costs, and whether
the responding party stores electronic data in a format designed to make discovery
impracticable or needlessly costly or burdensome.
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IV. EXAMINING THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26(B)(2)

The proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) purports to make it
more difficult for a party to request discovery of data that the Rule
terms "not reasonably accessible." The benefits of such a rule are
evident. As e-discovery becomes increasingly prevalent, a rule
precluding the discovery of electronic data that is "not reasonably
accessible" would help keep discovery costs from building to a point
where litigation is no longer a feasible option for many parties.
However, the way that the Civil Rules Advisory Committee defines
the key term "good cause" in Rule 26(b)(2) creates an exception that
effectively undermines the purpose of the Rule.
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee proposes the following
language be added to existing Rule 26(b)(2):
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information that the party identifies as not reasonably
accessible. On motion by the requesting party, the responding
party must show that the information is not reasonably
accessible. If that showing is made, the court may order
discovery of the information for good 129
cause and may specify
terms and conditions for such discovery.
The new language contains two key terms that require further
explanation and definition: "not reasonably accessible" and "good
cause." The Committee Note explains that electronically stored
information that can only be located and retrieved with substantial
effort and expense will ordinarily not be considered reasonably
accessible. 130 The Note lists as examples information stored only for
disaster-recovery purposes, "legacy" data retained in obsolete
systems, and information that was deleted and is only retrievable
using expensive forensic techniques.131 Thus, the Note defines what
constitutes data that is not reasonably accessible by the level of cost
and burden required to retrieve it. The determination is not based on
whether the party routinely accesses the information in the ordinary

129. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 11, at
6.
130. Id. at 11.
131. Id. Legacy data refers to data archives in retired computer systems that require
search engines that are no longer available. Legacy data is incompatible with newer
computer systems, and must be retrieved from retired models at great expense. MOORE,
supra note 18,
37A.04[3], 37A.04[5][e].
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course of business. 32 Whether the data is accessible in the ordinary
course of business will necessarily affect the level of the cost and
burden required to retrieve it. But the Note focuses on the cost and
burden of retrieving electronic data, and not its categorization as data
not reasonably accessible in the ordinary course of business, as the
basis for the definition of data that is not reasonably accessible.
The Committee's definition of information not reasonably
accessible is designed to be more flexible and forward-looking than
the old definition if data not routinely accessed in the ordinary course
of business. It recognizes that the determination of whether data is
reasonably accessible depends on the particular circumstances, and
that the definition of what is reasonably accessible may change as
technology develops.133 For practical purposes, data that is not
reasonably accessible because of the cost associated with retrieving it
and data that is not accessed in the course of business will presently
encompass the same types of data. But the underlying difference in
the definitions will become apparent as technology develops. It is
probable that in the near future data that is not accessed in the
ordinary course of business will be relatively cheap to retrieve using
new technology. Where this is the case, the rationale for protecting
data not accessed in the ordinary course of business disappears.
Thus, the Committee's definition is an improvement over the former
case law definition of what constitutes non-accessible data because it
better reflects the purpose of the delineation.
Under the proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2), data that is
identified as reasonably accessible (data that can be accessed without
expending substantial effort or incurring substantial expense) is
discoverable, but it is still possible that the limitations listed in the
current Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii) may apply.134 So, under the
new formulation of Rule 26(b)(2), a court can even now issue a Rule
26(c) protective order for reasonably accessible data if the court
determines that the limitations listed in Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii)
apply to the discovery request. 135 The proposed amendment to the
Rule does not alter the limits of discoverability of accessible data.
However, the proposed amendment does purport to limit the
discoverability of electronic data identified as not reasonably
132. Id. at 12. The Committee's definition of data that is not reasonably accessible thus
does not include all of the types of data not used for business purposes, namely metadata
and systems data.
133.

Id.

134. Id. at 13.
135. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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accessible. When a party demonstrates that the information sought is
not reasonably accessible, the court can either deny the discovery
request, or the court can order the discovery, provided the requesting
party shows good cause. 136 The Note describes the good-cause
analysis as "balanc[ing] the requesting party's need for the
information against the burden on the responding party,' 1 37 and states
further that "[clourts addressing such concerns have properly referred
to the limitations in Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii) ... in deciding
when and whether the effort involved in obtaining such information is
138
warranted."
This explanation of the good-cause analysis poses a problem.
The proposed amendment to the Rule is designed to provide
protection against the discovery of electronic data that is not
reasonably accessible. A requesting party should only be allowed to
compel discovery of this category of data if it demonstrates good
cause, which should represent a standard greater than the protections
Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii) currently affords. But the Note
accompanying the amended Rule defines the good-cause analysis as
tracking the considerations listed in Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). If
courts interpret this amended Rule as not providing any additional
protection against the discovery of electronic data that is not
reasonably accessible, then the amendment will have accomplished
nothing.
It is important to note that the Committee's explanation of the
terms "not reasonably accessible" and "good cause" appears in the
Note accompanying the Rule, and the Note does not carry the force
of law. 13 9 However, despite their diminished authority, the Note has
had a considerable impact on the courts' interpretation of the Rules.
The federal courts cite to the Committee Note when explaining the
reasoning for their holdings.14 The Supreme Court has also cited to
136. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note
11, at 11.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 11-12.
139.

STEPHEN C. YAZELL, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WITH SELECTED

STATUTES AND CASES-2003 xvi (Aspen Publishers 2003) ("[T]hese notes often serve the
same function for the Rules that legislative history does for statutes.").
140. See, e.g., Shores v. Ark. Valley Envrtl. & Utility Auth., No. 77-G-0604-S, 1980
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10979, at *7-8 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 28, 1980) (relying on the comments of
the Advisory Committee in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine the
circumstances required to maintain a class action and stating, "[i]t is unfortunate that the
comments of the Advisory Committee are not printed in the usual printed copies of the
rules themselves. There is a paucity of Advisory Committee comment in the printed text
of the rules available to this court.... The court considers these comments to be entirely
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the Committee Note, as it did in Bankers Trust Company v. Mallis.141

In fact, the presumption that the responding party must pay for the
cost of production is not written in the Rules themselves. 42 Rather,
this belief originates from the Committee Note to the 1970
Amendment to Rule 34, and was subsequently adopted by the federal
courts and became case law. 143 The Supreme Court confirmed this

presumption in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,1" where the
Court analogized to the discovery rules in allowing the production of
electronically stored information and assigning the burden of the cost

of production to the responding party. 145 Further, the federal courts
relied on the Committee Note to the 1970 Amendment to Rule 34 to

clarify that Rule 34's language providing for the production of "data
compilations from which information can be readily ...translated"
The Note
electronic data compilations. 14
encompassed
accompanying the proposed amendment to Rule 26 is likely, then, to

determine the courts' interpretation of the phrases "not reasonably
accessible" and "good cause."
While the text of the Note accompanying the proposed
amendment to Rule 26 indicates that the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee established a good-cause analysis that affords no more

protection than the current Rule allows, this conclusion is
contradictory with the amending of the rule itself. The very fact that
the Committee added the phrase "good cause" indicates that it

envisioned a higher standard of protection for data that is not

dispositive of this contention of defendants.").
141. 435 U.S. 381, 384-85 (1978) (per curiam) (citing the Advisory Committee Notes to
the 1963 amendment of Rule 58 to clarify the intention of the Rule's separate document
requirement).
142. See Shariati, supra note 41, at 409.
143. See Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1136 (S.D.
Tex. 1976); Shariati, supra note 41, at 409-10, n.77 (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
34 advisory committee's notes, reprinted in WEST'S FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL
PROCEDURE AND RULES 188 (revised ed. 2003) (1970 Amendment)).
144. 437 U.S. 340 (1978).
145. Id. at 355-56, 358 (stating that the presumption under the discovery rules is "that
the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests," but
noting that the district court has the discretion to grant an order protecting the responding
party from "undue burden or expense").
146. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (2004); FED. R. CIv. P. 34 (2004) advisory committee's
notes, reprinted in WEST'S FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES 188
(revised ed. 2003) (1970 Amendment); Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210
F.R.D. 645, 652 (Minn. 2002) ("As the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 34, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure make clear, discovery of 'documents' 'applies to electronic data
compilations from which information can be obtained only with the use of detection
devices.' ").
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reasonably accessible. In Schlagenhauf v. Holder,147 the Supreme
Court addressed the use of the phrase "good cause" in a different
context and recognized that adding "good cause" to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure indicates that a higher standard must be
employed, as otherwise the requirement of good cause would be
meaningless. 48 Yet, the Committee Note directs courts conducting a
good-cause analysis to the case law established in Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC,149 Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris
Agency, 150 and McPeek v. Ashcroft... as examples of how to properly
apply a good-cause analysis.'5 2 While those cases dealt with the
discovery of electronic data that would be considered "not reasonably
accessible" under the new formulation of the Rule, the courts used
the framework of Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii) to guide their
decisions and did not apply a good-cause standard.
There are at least two main reasons it is important to distinguish
between the discoverability of accessible data and not reasonably
accessible data. First, as time passes, the amount of data that is not
reasonably accessible (in particular, backup data) will continue to
accumulate, raising the potential cost and burden of e-discovery. This
issue poses a particular problem to businesses, almost all of whom
maintain disaster backup tapes of their records.'5 3
Second, as the amount of electronic data grows, it will become
increasingly clear that the current remedy of shifting and sharing the
costs of discovery is not a cure at all, but merely a band-aid. The
costs will continue to rise and, whether they are borne by the
responding party, the requesting party, or are shared between the
two, they will reach a prohibitive level and discourage litigation. It is
happening now, as under the current interpretation of Rule 34, all
147. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
148. Id. at 118 ("The specific requirement of good cause would be meaningless if good
cause could be sufficiently established by merely showing that the desired materials are
relevant, for the relevancy standard has already been imposed by Rule 26(b). Thus, by
adding the words '... good cause ...

' the Rules indicate that there must be greater

showing of need under Rules 34 and 35 than under the other discovery rules.") (quoting
Guilford Nat'l Bank v. So. Ry. Co., 297 F.2d 921, 924 (4th Cir. 1962)).
149. 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
150. 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
151. 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
152. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 11, at
14. The Committee Note cites Zubulake, Rowe and McPeek only as examples, and does
not imply that these cases are the only cases on point.
153. One solution to this problem could be for businesses to maintain information
retention policies that call for the destruction of backup tapes after a reasonable period of
time.
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electronic information is equally discoverable. Plaintiffs are forcing
defendants to settle by submitting discovery requests so broad that
the cost to the
defendants of complying is greater than the cost of the
15 4
settlement.
The need to distinguish between the discoverability of accessible
data and not reasonably accessible data is not satisfied by the
proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2). This Comment proposes two
alternative solutions for the Committee's consideration.
V. PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING THE GOOD-CAUSE ANALYSIS

The proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) should provide a
heightened level of protection to electronic data identified as not
reasonably accessible. Under the Committee Note's interpretation of
good cause, data that is not reasonably accessible is afforded no
greater protection from discovery than is currently available to all
forms of discovery under Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii) and (iii). As the case
law, state rules, and recommendations of the Sedona Conference and
the ABA illustrate, there are many ways to achieve such heightened
protection. There are two potential solutions that merit consideration
by the Committee.
First, the Committee could change the Note's description of the
good-cause analysis and distinguish it from the analysis performed for
The
all discovery pursuant to Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).
Committee is wrong to equate the good-cause analysis with the
existing analysis conducted under Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). If
the good-cause analysis were stricter than the current restrictions, as
the Rule's language implies that it should be, it would provide the
necessary protection for data that is not reasonably accessible. The
Note should make it clear that the good-cause standard exceeds that
of the current limitations, perhaps borrowing the language of the
Sedona Conference and requiring a showing of "special need and
relevance."'55
It is not suggested that the Committee should spell out what
would constitute good cause. That determination necessarily depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each case and is the responsibility
of the courts. Other applications of the good-cause standard in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have relied on court interpretation
154. Corinne L. Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age:
DecidingWho Should Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 257,267-68 (2000).
155. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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to develop the meaning of the phrase.156 But the Committee should
use more stringent language to describe the good-cause analysis to
signal to the courts that the analysis requires a stronger showing of
need than that required for Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).
Second, the Committee could adopt a new definition :of
electronic data that is "not reasonably accessible." Instead of treating
backup data, legacy data, and deleted data the same, the Rule could
further distinguish among them. Under this formulation, there would
be three categories of electronic data: accessible data, which would
be discoverable subject only to the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii),
and (iii); backup and legacy data, which would be discoverable only
upon a showing of good cause (with the good-cause analysis being
stricter than that of Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii)); and deleted data,
which is never discoverable unless the requesting party can show that
the responding party intentionally deleted files to avoid discovery.157
In balancing the competing considerations of the need of the
requesting party to have the information and the burden on the
responding party to produce it, it is difficult to advocate any brightline rule that disallows the discovery of any type of data. This
difficulty is likely the reason no authority has advocated protecting all
forms of data considered not reasonably accessible from discovery.
However, it is possible to afford this protection to deleted data,
because it can be argued that deleted electronic data should be
treated in the same manner as discarded traditional discovery
materials. There is no precedent requiring litigants to go to great
lengths and expense to locate and reconstruct paper evidence that
was thrown away. Additionally, an examination of the language of
Rule 34 shows that it provides for the production of "data
compilations from which information can be readily translated." '58
Deleted data cannot be readily translated-it must be reconstructed
using expensive technology.'59 This formulation of the Rule protects
156. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 789-90 (1st Cir. 1988)
(citing the case law definition of Rule 26(c)'s good-cause requirement).
157. This recommendation is similar to the recommendations outlined by the Sedona
Conference in Principles 8 and 9. See supra Section IV. The distinction between the
recommendations of the Sedona Conference and the recommendation in this Comment is
the standard required for discovery-the Sedona Conference advocates a Rule
26(b)(2)(iii) standard for backup tapes and a "special need and relevance" standard for
deleted data. In contrast, this Comment recommends a Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) standard for
accessible data, a "good cause" (special need and relevance) standard for backup tapes,
and no discovery of deleted data absent a finding of bad faith on the part of the
responding party.
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (2004).
159. New technology may reduce the costs of reconstructing deleted data, but even if it

2005

ELECTRONIC DATA DISCOVERY

1011

against discovery abuse. If the requesting party can show the court

that the responding party intentionally deleted data to avoid its
discovery, then the court could order that discovery be had or impose

sanctions on the responding party."6
There are several arguments in favor of a bright-line rule either
completely prohibiting discovery of a category of electronic data or

allowing unqualified discovery of all electronic data.

These

arguments, which are at odds with this Comment's second proposal,
ought to be addressed.

The first argument advocates a bright-line rule that precludes
discovery of deleted electronic data. There are two justifications in
support of this approach. First, some critics of e-discovery have
argued that some electronic data that is not reasonably accessible, in
particular deleted data, should never be discoverable under any

condition. These critics argue that for traditional paper discovery, the
Rules do not require a litigant to search for or restore discarded
information, yet the current interpretation of the Rules regarding ediscovery requires just such an effort.161
Second, a similar argument contends that deleted files should be
treated as discarded, undiscoverable, irrelevant ideas to ensure that
the free exchange of ideas is not impeded.162 The casual and private
nature of computer files and e-mail correspondence encourages the
expression of ideas and allows the author to delete those ideas that
are irrelevant, or just imperfect.'6 3 To allow discovery of deleted files
could curtail the use of e-mail as a vehicle for sharing ideas out of fear

that a rejected idea might look like more. 161
However, an unconditional exclusion of deleted electronic data
ceases to be cost prohibitive, the other arguments for protecting deleted data are still
valid.
160. Rule 37 provides the authority for a court to sanction a party for failure to comply
with a discovery order. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
161. Marron, supra note 33, at 897-98 ("[T]he current rules are the equivalent of
requiring a litigant to first dig through their garbage for huge amounts of shredded and
discarded paper correspondence and then expend considerable resources to repair the
letters and documents found.").
162. Hon. James M. Rosenbaum, In Defense of the DELETE Key, 3 GREEN BAG 2d
393, 394 (2000) ("The fallacy in the 'truth' of the recovered e-mail or computer file is that
it might just have been a bad idea, properly rejected, and consigned to an imperfectly
labeled wastebasket. The problem is that on the computer's hard drive, it looks like
more.").
163. Id.
164. Id. ("In some ways, the greater risk in the preservation and discovery of
computerized material lies in the knowledge that things will not be expressed, and ideas
will not be exchanged, out of a pernicious-but valid-fear that their mere expression will
be judged tantamount to the act.").
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from the discovery process is not a satisfactory solution. Proponents
of this approach neglect to consider the likely result if the Rules were
to preclude all discovery of deleted data. A rule excluding discovery
of all deleted data would encourage the purposeful deletion, in bad
faith, of electronic files a litigant or potential litigant wishes to protect
from discovery.
In contrast, other commentators argue in favor of a bright-line
rule that states that no electronic data should be protected from
discovery, notwithstanding the cost associated with producing it.
Advocates of this approach point to three justifications for their view.
First, proponents of this approach argue that producing electronic
data is a foreseeable cost of business. This argument was employed
by an Illinois District Court in In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs.165 It was also soundly refuted by the D.C. District Court in
McPeek v. Ashcroft,'166 which noted that the cost of business argument
assumes that businesses have an alternative to storing data on backup
tapes. 67
Second, proponents of allowing discovery of all electronic data

argue that a rule that provides heightened protection of data that is
not reasonably accessible will encourage parties to delete information

to avoid its discovery. But this argument does not take into account
two considerations. First, litigants are not at liberty to delete
anything they wish. Once a party is on notice that litigation may
arise, it is under a duty to preserve all information related to the
litigation. 6 8 Failure to preserve information results in sanctions.169
Further, individuals and especially businesses are often required to
keep certain types of information for a period of time established by
law. 7 ° Second, there is nothing in the current Rule that would
prevent a party from permanently deleting information before the

165. See No. 94 C 897, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 1995) ("[I]f
a party chooses an electronic storage method, the necessity for a retrieval program or
method is an ordinary foreseeable risk.").
166. 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
167. See supra note 94.
168. See, e.g., Banco Latino v. Lopez, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ("A
litigant is under a duty to preserve evidence which it knows, or reasonably should know, is
relevant in an action."); MOORE, supra note 18, 37A-33.
169. See, e.g., Banco Latino, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1277 ("Sanctions may be imposed upon
litigants who destroy documents while on notice that they are or may be relevant to
litigation or potential litigation, or are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence."); MOORE, supra note 18, 37A-36.
170. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 169.2 (2004) (mandating that all producers of pesticides keep
records regarding the pesticides for a period of two years).
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business is on notice of litigation. 7 ' One could even argue that the
current Rule encourages permanent deletion more so than the
amended Rule would, because under the current Rule a party is more
likely to have to produce "deleted" data.
Finally, commentators advocate allowing discovery of all
electronic data on the simple premise that all potential evidence
should be available for disclosure. But allowing this breadth of
that is costdiscovery means accepting a system of discovery
172
prohibitive, even though it has a low rate of error.
The cost of retrieving backup data and deleted data has become
crippling for all parties. To advocate discovery of all data based on
the premise that it is a cost of doing business will preclude the option
of litigation for many who cannot afford it. It is better to limit the
"cost of doing business" argument to situations where the responding
party produces the information for its own defense. That is, the
retrieval of data that is not reasonably accessible should only be a
foreseeable cost of business when it benefits the business. If the
business does not need the information for its defense, it should not
necessarily have to. pay for its production. In fact, the Committee
Note for the proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) makes clear that
if the responding party has accessed the requested data, it cannot
by arguing that it incurred substantial
avoid producing the data
1 73
it.
accessing
in
expense
This Comment proposes a solution of further delineating the
categories of electronic data, which avoids the shortcomings of both
of these absolute positions. By imposing a bad faith limitation, the
solution protects against purposeful deletion of data to avoid
discovery. And limiting the discovery of deleted electronic data to
situations where the requesting party can show that the responding
party intentionally deleted files to avoid discovery helps ensure that
the cost of e-discovery does not rise to such a level as to foreclose the
option of litigation.

TM
remove
171. Software products such as the aptly named Evidence Eliminator
"deleted" data from a computer hard drive permanently. See Evidence Eliminator, at
www.evidence-eliminator.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
172. Cf Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal-Economic Analysis of Comparative Civil
Procedure,45 AM. J. COMP. L. 905,906 (1997) (asserting, from the standpoint of welfare
economics, that the ideal discovery model is one at the efficient middle ground between
the options of high costs and low error versus low costs and high error).
173. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 11, at
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CONCLUSION

The effect of having a good-cause standard that is no more
stringent than the existing limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii)
is to negate the distinction between the discoverability of electronic
data that is accessible and that which is not reasonably accessible.
Said differently, employing a weak good-cause standard renders
useless the amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) limiting the discoverability
of not reasonably accessible electronic data.
Preserving this
distinction between accessible data and not reasonably accessible data
is vital if the Committee seeks to reduce the prohibitive costs of
conducting e-discovery. As this Comment illustrates, it is necessary
to reduce the costs of e-discovery to keep it from restricting access to
litigation as a means of resolving disputes.
To ensure that "not reasonably accessible" data is protected
from discovery except in situations of special need, the Committee
should revise the Note accompanying the proposed amendment to
Rule 26(b)(2) to include language that encourages the courts to
develop a good-cause standard stricter than the existing restrictions
laid out in Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). In addition, the Committee
ought to consider further delineating electronic data into three
categories: that which is accessible and thus discoverable, that which
is not reasonably accessible and thus discoverable only upon a
showing of good cause, and that which is deleted, which is not
discoverable except upon a showing that the responding party
intentionally deleted information to avoid discovery.
If the
Committee were to adopt these suggestions, it would accomplish its
goal of protecting electronic data that is not reasonably accessible
from discovery while preserving the purpose of the discovery rules to
allow for production of evidence relevant to a litigant's claim or
defense.
SARAH A. L. PHILLIPS
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inspiring the topic of this Comment.

